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Melvin Salahuddin**
Abstract
This article is an examination of the implementation of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a Multilateral Environmental Agreement
(MEA) in Indonesia. It identifies domestic challenges of the Convention in Indonesia’s
decentralisation. The implementation of decentralisation policy in 2001 worsens the
inherent problems faced by the Convention in Indonesia’s legal system. As a MEA,
the Convention contains only general rules for the state parties and no specific legal
obligation to reduce emission. The Convention also has legitimacy problems. The
Indonesia’s method to transform treaties into domestic legal system is still problematic.
These two challenges are worsened by the implementation of decentralisation policy.
The national government faces difficulties to drive lower government units to adhere
to the Convention rules because they have new authorities that can constraint effort
to achieve the goal of the Convention.
Keywords: UNFCCC, Decentralization, Treaty Implementation
Abstrak
Artikel ini adalah eksaminasi terhadap implementasi Konvensi Perubahan Iklim
(UNFCCC) yang merupakan satu bentuk perjanjian multilateral di bidang lingkungan
(MEA). Artikel ini mengidentifikasi tantangan yang dihadapi oleh UNFCCC dalam
konteks desentralisasi di Indonesia. Kebijakan desentralisasi telah memperburuk
masalah yang selama ini telah dihadapi oleh UNFCCC di Indonesia. Sebagai salah
satu MEA, UNFCCC hanya mengandung aturan umum untuk negara-negara anggota
dan tidak mempunyai kewajiban hukum khusus untuk mengurangi emisi. Tanpa
kewajiban khusus, negara-negara anggota, terutama negara berkembang, belum
terikat atas target level emisi tertentu. Selain itu, UNFCCC mempunyai masalah
legitimasi di Indonesia yang berhubungan dengan metode transformasi perjanjian
internasional ke dalam hukum nasional. Masalah legitimasi membuat UNFCCC
menjadi sulit untuk mengikat entitas di dalam negeri. Dalam konteks desentralisasi,
kedua masalah tersebut memberikan kesulitan bagi pemerintah pusat dalam
mengarahkan pemerintah daerah untuk melaksanakan upaya untuk mencapai
tujuan UNFCCC. Desentralisasi memberikan kewenangan pemerintah daerah untuk
membuat kebijakan yang dapat bertentangan dengan UNFCCC.
Kata Kunci: UNFCCC, Desentralisasi, Implementasi Perjanjian Internasional
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insights and comments during the amendments process of the Chapter.
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I. Introduction
“First, your return to shore was not part of our negotiations nor our
agreement so I must do nothing. And secondly, you must be a pirate for the
pirate’s code to apply and you’re not. And thirdly, the code is more what
you’d call “guidelines” than actual rules.” (Captain Barbossa, Pirates of the
Caribbean: the Curse of the Black Pearl).
The words of Barbossa above cynically but accurately describe the
position of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC/Convention) in the context of Indonesia’s decentralisation. Though
Indonesia is a party of the Convention, the Multilateral Environmental
Agreement (MEA) cannot automatically bind the lower government units,
the provincial and local governments, as they are not involved in the climate
negotiations (although they have the burden to implement the Convention).
The Convention also lacks in legitimacy. The process of transforming treaties
into Indonesia’s legal system has raised legality issues and consequently, it is
not clear whether the Convention has properly become a part of Indonesian
law. In addition, Indonesia has no firm legal obligation to reduce Greenhouse
Gas Emissions (GHG) under the Convention. Without a firm legal obligation,
what substantive obligations will Indonesia perform? These issues have
characterised the existence of the Convention in Indonesia’s decentralisation.
This article aims to examine the Convention in Indonesia’s decentralised
state model. How has decentralisation constrained the national government
in fulfilling its commitment to the Convention? It is argued that a combination
of legal and political constraints arising in decentralised Indonesia have
burdened the national government in performing climate efforts under the
Convention.
II. The Convention in Indonesia’s Legal System

The Convention, as an MEA, emphasises the vital role of the national
government. The national government represents a nation-state in negotiating
an MEA at the international level.1 In return, the national government
must ensure compliance of the MEA, provided that the MEA is applicable
to all the territories of the state parties.2 To ensure its national application,
however, domestic factors are vital in determining its success. In this case, the
implementation of the MEA’s rules is a vital process, and will depend on each
state’s domestic law.3

1
See UNEP Manual on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (UNEP, 2006) at 51.
2
Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, (2nd ed, Cambridge, UK, 2007), p. 200.
3
Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge (Mass) 2010), p. 212.
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A. Review of the Convention in Indonesia’s Legal System
1. Treaties in Indonesia’s Law
The legal status of the Convention in Indonesia’s legal system is unclear;
as the legitimacy of an international agreement as a source of Indonesia’s
law is problematic. The status of the ratifying laws (acts and presidential
regulations) is subject to questions as to whether those laws have substantive
character or is only procedural, especially when they have no further
implementing regulations.4

In general practice, an international agreement agreed by the national
government is ratified by an act or a presidential decree (this decree is in the
form of a presidential regulation since the introduction of Act No. 10 2004).5
Article 9 of Act No. 24/2000 concerning on Treaties states that “Ratification
of a treaty as referred to in paragraph (1) shall be conducted by way of a law
or a presidential decree.” 6

This article suggests that Indonesia follows a dualist approach, whereby
treaties cannot have effect on national jurisdiction unless they have been
specifically transformed into national law by legislations or any other means
of legislative procedures.7 In order to be enforced by judges in a domestic
court, international law must be made as parts of the national law.8 This
approach is in contrast with a monist approach, which perceives that “treaties
may, without legislation, become part of domestic law once they have been
concluded in accordance with the constitution and they have entered into
force for the state”.9
Furthermore, an act or a presidential regulation that is enacted following
the conclusion of an international agreement only contains two articles. The
first is Indonesia’s recognition of the relevant international agreement along
with its provisions, and the second is recognition that such an agreement
comes into effect in Indonesia’s legal system.10 This practice suggests two
implications. First, a treaty becomes a part of Indonesia’s law after the
enactment of a ratifying act or presidential regulation. An act or a presidential
regulation is a recognised source of law in Indonesia’s legal system.11 Second,

4
Direktorat Jenderal Hukum dan Perjanjian Internasional, Departemen Luar Negeri Perjanjian
Internasional Dalam Teori dan Praktek di Indonesia: Komplilasi Permasalahan (International Agreement in
Theory and Practice in Indonesia), (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, 2008), p. 6.
5
See the Forming of Laws Act 2004 10 (revoked), art 46, 54 and 56.
6
The English translation of Act 24/2000 on International Agreement <http://www.indonesiaottawa.org/indonesia/law_treaties.php.html> at 18 June 2010.
7
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, (5th Ed, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003), p.
129.
8
Gillian D. Triggs, International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices, (Butterworths Law,
London, 2006), p. 105
9
Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005),
p. 80.
10
See for instance, the Validation of Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Act 2005
11 (Indonesia). In the level of a presidential regulation, see for instance, President Regulation 2010 2 (Indonesia) on the Validation of Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) Trade in Goods Agreement.
11
Indonesia’s law sources and hierarchies are as follows: (1) Constitution; (2) TAP MPR; (3) Act
(legislation)/Government Regulation as the substitute of an Act in the event of Emergency (PERPU); (4)
Government Regulation; (5) President Regulation; (6) Provincial Regulation; (7) Local Government/City
Regulation. See the Forming of Law Act 2011 12 (Indonesia), art 7 (1). Other sources of law can be issued by
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the text of a treaty will become directly applicable in the legal system once
a ratifying law is introduced, and will be applicable according to a specified
date.

However, although the transformation process employs a recognised
source of law in Indonesia’s legal system, the ratifying law is still subject
to legality issues. It is not yet clear if such practice actually transforms
international rules into Indonesia’s legal system or only recognises that
Indonesia has committed to an international agreement.

In fact, the legal status of the ratifying laws has raised concerns in
Indonesia. Agusman suggests that two sides to the debates on the status of
ratifying law have emerged. The first group believes that ratification in the form
of an act or a Presidential Regulation, has transformed international norms
into national law. The laws therefore have substantive character because they
have normative effect.12 The second group perceives that ratification laws are
procedural measures only: these laws are only approval from DPR and thus
they have no normative effects.13 This division on the meaning of ratification
can create problems in understanding the legality of ratifying laws.
In between these stances, Manan suggests that if the ratification of a
treaty resulted in the form of an act, this act, as long as no specific provisions
stated otherwise, would have the same status as other acts.14 Manan,
however, raises concerns that this perception contains a contradiction when
it is perceived from the legal source and law making concepts. On one hand,
a treaty contains norms that are debated in international levels (not in the
Parliament), while on the other hand the ratified-treaty takes form as an act,
which is a valid legal source, is debated in and agreed by the Parliament.15

Kusumaatmadja has a different perspective. He claims that although
the Indonesian Constitution does not provide an indication whether
Indonesia follows dualism or monism, Indonesia tends to follow monism.16 To
implement international law in the national legal system, Indonesia tends to
accept and enforce all international obligations automatically after a treaty is
ratified, without the need to enact an implementing legislation.17 In addition,
the amendment of a treaty will directly bind Indonesia.18 Unfortunately,

government bodies, such as ministries, as long as there is an order from a higher law source or pursuant to
their authorities. See art 8 (2). TAP MPR is a decision of the People Assembly. TAP MPR which were enacted
from 1960-2002 and never been revoked are still in force. See the elucidation of art 7 (1) b.
12
Damos Dumoli Agusman, “Status Hukum Perjanjian Internasional Dalam Hukum Nasional Republik Indonesia: Tinjauan dari Perpsektif Praktek Indonesia” (“Legal Status of International Agreement in
National Law of Rebublic of Indonesia: Study of Indonesian Practical Perspective”), (2008) Paper presented
in the Focus Group Discussion on the Status of Treaty in Indonesian Legal System, organized by Department of Foreign Affair and Padjajaran University, Bandung November 29th 2008, p. 4.
13
Ibid.
14
Bagir Manan, “Akibat Hukum di Dalam Negeri Pengesahan Perjanjian Internasional: Tinjauan
Hukum Tata Negara” Paper presented in the Focus Group Discussion on the Status of Treaty in Indonesian
Legal System, organized by Department of Foreign Affair and Padjajaran University, (Bandung November
29th 2008), p. 10.
15
Ibid., p. 9-10.
16
Muchtar Kusumaatmadja, Pengantar Hukum Internasional (Introduction of International Law),
(vol 1, Ed 9, 1990), p. 65-67.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
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Kusumaatmadja adds, this tendency is not a deliberate procedure adopted by
the parliament and the Indonesian government but rather is a practice that
has developed over time.19

The Kusumaatmadja’s approach of observing practice is one possible
way to clarify the legality of treaties. However, observing practices might
also create confusion: whether a ratifying act is enough for a treaty to be
implemented, or a ratifying act still needs implementing acts. This confusion
is manifest in practice. The Indonesian Foreign Affairs Ministry has identified
inconsistencies in implementing international agreements. In some cases,
even though a treaty has already been ratified by an act or regulation, it still
requires another act or regulation to be implemented into the national legal
system.20

This legality concern, however, seems irrelevant before the courts.
According to Hadyono, the use of international law by courts depends mainly
on the status of a treaty under national law, and specifically whether a treaty
has been transformed into Indonesia’s law.21 At the same time, however,
judges are not absolutely bound to consider the legitimacy of the ratifying
laws when they want to apply those laws in a case.22 In exercising their judicial
power, judges also consider the political position of the national government
on issues relating to an international agreement.23 Thus, one could say that
a valid legal status is vital for international laws to apply in Indonesia’s legal
system, but at the same time the legality issue is irrelevant, as the courts will
follow the political stance of the national government. Even though a treaty
has a legality issue, if the national government is willing to apply its rules, the
court will follow.
In a recent case, the Constitutional Court examined Act No. 38/2008
on the Ratification of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Charter.24 A coalition of NGOs perceives that the implementation of ASEAN
Charter through the Act creates a single ASEAN market, which may hamper
national industry, especially on small and medium scale industry. Therefore,
the coalition perceives that the Charter is against the Constitution,25 and urges26
the Court to revoke article 1 (5)27 that requires Indonesia to implement a

Ibid.
Ibid.
21
Suparti Hadyono, “Praktek Penerapan Perjanjian Internasional Dalam Putusan Hakim” (“Practice of International Agreement’s Application in Judges’ Verdict”) (2008) Paper Presented in the Focus
Group Discussion on the Status of Treaty in Indonesian Legal System, organized by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Padjajaran University, (Bandung November 29th, 2008), p. 2.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
ASEAN Charter (adopted in Singapore, November 20, 2007, enter into force December 2008).
25
See the Decision of Constitutional Court No. 33/PUU-IX/2011 on the Examination of Act No.
38/2008 on the Ratification of Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, p. 94.
26
See the Decision of Constitutional Court No. 33/PUU-IX/2011 on the Examination of Act No.
38/2008 on the Ratification of Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, p. 94.
27
See ASEAN Charter (adopted in Singapore, November 20, 2007, enter into force December
2008), art 1 (5): “to create a single market and production base which is stable, prosperous, highly competitive and economically integrated with effective facilitation for trade and investment in which there is free
flow of goods, services and investment; facilitated movement of business persons, professionals, talents
and labour; and freer flow of capital.”
19
20
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single ASEAN market, and article 2 (2) (n)28 that reduces Indonesia’s economic
sovereignty in creating its national economic policies. After almost 2 years of
examination, the Court concluded its decision on February 4th 2013. In its
decision, the Court, by majority, rejects the petition to revoke the articles.29

This case can show how the status of a ratifying act can create a dilemma
for Indonesia. On one hand, the fact that Act No. 38/2008 is a ratifying act
does not make it different from non-ratifying acts. Thus, the Constitutional
Court has the authority to examine the Act, 30including the Charter itself as it
is accepted as a part of the Act.31 On the other hand, norms in the Charter are
a result of negotiations between the members of ASEAN in international level.
This makes the norms in the Charter different from norms in non-ratifying
acts which are debated by the executive and the Parliament. As a result, the
Constitutional Court faces difficulties in revoking any articles in the Charter
even though they contradict Indonesia’s Constitution.

In its decision, the Court concludes that the arguments provided by
the Coalition of NGOs do not have a sound legal basis, because of the Charter
which allows members of ASEAN to later decide whether or not to implement
the Charter, which can be done so through necessary measures, including the
enactment of a new act.32 Art 5 (2) states: “member shall take all necessary
measures, including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to
effectively implement the provisions of this Charter and to comply with all
obligations of membership.”33 In this case, the word “shall” indicates that
the Charter strongly encourages ASEAN members to introduce necessary
measures for the implementation of the Charter. However, Indonesia has not
yet implemented Article 5 (2) of the ASEAN Charter as there are no domestic
measures introduced yet for the implementation of the Charter. Therefore
the Court concludes that article 5 (2) is not effectively in force in Indonesia’s
jurisdiction.34 The decision seems to suggest that since no domestic legislation
has been introduced (except the Ratifying Law of the ASEAN Charter), the
Charter is not effective yet in Indonesian law, and the Court only examines Act
No. 38/2008 as an instrument of transformation but not domestic measures
for the implementation of the Charter.
28
See ASEAN Charter (adopted in Singapore, November 20, 2007, enter into force December
2008), art 2 (2) (n): “adherence to multilateral trade rules and ASEAN’s rules-based regimes for effective
implementation of economic commitments and progressive reduction towards elimination of all barriers
to regional economic integration, in a market-driven economy.”
29
See the Decision of Constitutional Court No. 33/PUU-IX/2011 on the Examination of Act No.
38/2008 on the Ratification of Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, part 5.
30
See the Decision of Constitutional Court No. 33/PUU-IX/2011 on the Examination of Act No.
38/2008 on the Ratification of Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, p. 181.
31
See Ratification of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Charter Act 2008 38,
art 1.
32
See the Decision of Constitutional Court No. 33/PUU-IX/2011 on the Examination of Act No.
38/2008 on the Ratification of Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, part 4, para 4.3.
33
See ASEAN Charter (adopted in Singapore, November 20, 2007, enter into force December
2008), art 5 (2): “member shall take all necessary measures, including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement the provisions of this Charter and to comply with all obligations
of membership”.
34
See the Decision of Constitutional Court No. 33/PUU-IX/2011 on the Examination of Act No.
38/2008 on the Ratification of Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, part 3, para 3.24.
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The decision cannot provide a complete clarification on the status of a
treaty in Indonesia’s law. The Court’s decision only recognises that the legality
of Act No. 38/2008 that ratifies the ASEAN Charter equates with other acts
that are debated in and agreed to by the Parliament. This makes it a subject
within the authority of the Constitutional Court. Thus, this case shows that a
ratifying law (in this case Act No. 38/2008) is a valid instrument that makes
the ASEAN Charter part of Indonesia’s law. The recognition of the function of
the ratification Act (Act No 38/2008) by the Court is very vital to clarify the
status of ratification laws. The Court’s decision can reduce uncertainty on the
legality of ratification laws in Indonesia.
Unfortunately the Court’s decision leaves a question. If Act No. 38/2008
has transformed the ASEAN Charter into a valid legal source, then can the
Court revoke any articles in the text of the Charter? Thus, will the Court
revoke the article 1 (5) and article 2 (2) (n) when they are in contradiction
with Indonesia’s Constitution? This question is particularly important as the
Court rejected the application from the NGOs to revoke the articles because
Indonesia has not yet introduced the “necessary measures” that are required by
article 5 (2) of the Charter, not because the articles are in line with Indonesia’s
Constitution. It seems to suggest that when “necessary measures” have been
implemented, they have potential to contradict Indonesia’s Constitution and
therefore the articles can be revoked by the Court. Should this be the Case,
Indonesia will ask for a re-negotiation, or propose a reservation. This makes
the future implementation of ASEAN Charter uncertain when other ASEAN
countries face a similar situation.

The existence of the “necessary measures” requirement for the Charter
to have domestic implementation might suggest that Charter itself provides
room for Indonesia to use Act 38/2008 as a mean for ratification but not
implementation measures. Thus, although the state parties have ratified the
Charter, it still needs implementing measures to have domestic effects. However,
it is important to note that the Charter is a multilateral treaty and functions
as legal and institutional framework for ASEAN.35 As a result, this Charter
functions as a guidance of the ASEAN countries to achieve future consensus.
It is this future consensus that might require domestic implementation
measures. Yet, the potential contradictions within the Constitution of each
ASEAN nations still exist, which can harden the future negotiations between
the ASEAN nations on the implementation of the Charter through domestic
measures.
Moreover, the Court’s decision implies that the use of an act to ratify
a treaty is not a plausible method. The Court states that the use of an act
to ratify a treaty should be re-considered.36 This suggestion indicates that the
Constitutional Court realises that examining a ratifying act, can be problematic.
When the Court revokes an article from a treaty due to contradictions towards
the Constitution, Indonesia might face consequences from other contracting
parties. In international law, a state is under general obligation to comply with

35
See the preamble of ASEAN Charter (adopted in Singapore, November 20, 2007, enter into force
December 2008): “to establish through this Charter, the legal and institutional framework for ASEAN.”
36
See the Decision of Constitutional Court No. 33/PUU-IX/2011 on the Examination of Act No.
38/2008 on the Ratification of Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, part 3, para 3.23,
point 3, p. 196.
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the treaty, and in principle will bear responsibility for breaches, conducted by
its judicial, legislative and executive organs.37 The use of an act to ratify a treaty
can drive the Court to examine it, while a revocation can breach Indonesia’s
international commitments. Thus, the Court’s decision implies that Indonesia
should change the method to transform a treaty into national law.

2. The Convention in Indonesia
The general practice of ratification in Indonesia creates problems for
many MEAs. Because many MEAs only contain general rules,38 even when a
ratifying law is accepted as a domestic implementation measure, MEAs can
only become a soft legal instrument in Indonesia.

The Convention is not an exception. Act No 6/1994, the Ratifying Act of
the Convention, only contains two articles: a validation article and an article
specifying the date that the Convention comes into effect in Indonesia’s
legal system.39 This suggests that the character of the Convention as a soft
legal instrument is directly transformed into Indonesia’s legal system. The
Convention recognises that “states should enact effective environmental
legislation....”40 In addition, state parties should “protect the climate system
for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the
basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities.”41 The term “should” indicates
that the Convention only encourages its state parties to introduce domestic
law as an implementation measure, which is vital for achievement of the
ultimate goal of the Convention.42 Thus, Act. No. 6/1994 directly inherits the
“encouragement” character of the Convention, without any changes that can
improve the character of the Convention in the legal system.
Furthermore, the enactment of Act No. 6/1994 does not guarantee
that the Act will become a binding consideration on the enactment of other
acts that are associated with climate change problems. For instance, prior to
decentralisation in 1999, the main environmental protection was Act No. 23 of
1997 (replaced by Act No. 32/2009) concerning environmental management
(the Environmental Management Act, EMA). The EMA emphasised the need
to consider climate change as an element in environmental management,
along with spatial planning, biodiversity protection, and the use of natural
Malcolm N. Shaw, see note 9, p. 128.
See Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment,
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) at 13; Jutta Brunnée, “COPing with Consent: Law-Making under
Multilateral Environmental Agreements” (2002) 15 (1) Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL) 1 at 7;
Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, Guide to International Environmental Law, (Martinus Nijhooff Publishers, the Netherlands, 2007), p. 78.
39
See Validation on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Act
2004 6 (Indonesia).
40
UNFCCC (opened for signature June 20, 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) at introduction:
“Recognizing that States should enact effective environmental legislation, that environmental standards,
management objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context to
which they apply, and that standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted
economic and social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries”. Emphasis added.
41
UNFCCC (opened for signature June 20, 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) art 3 (1).
42
UNFCCC (opened for signature June 20, 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) art 2.
37
38
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resources.43 Yet, the EMA did not provide further measures to address climate
change, and excluded Act. No. 6/1994 as a binding consideration. Similarly,
the Forestry Act No. 41/1999 does not refer to the Ratifying Act of the
Convention.

Indonesia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol does not improve the
character of the Convention either. Act No. 17/2004 concerning the validation
of the Kyoto Protocol, in which the Ratifying Act of the Convention is one of
its binding considerations,44 merely accepts the Protocol’s rules. The use of
the Ratifying Act as a binding consideration cannot change the soft character
of the Convention, as Indonesia has no legal commitment to reduce GHG
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol.

Another problem for the Convention is the status of its future decisions.
As a MEA, the parties to the Convention will continue negotiating further
agreement to improve the rules of the Convention. When the parties have
achieved consensus under the Convention, what will be their status in
Indonesia’s legal system? This is particularly important as the case of the
consensus can take form of a protocol (i.e Kyoto Protocol), decisions of
Conference of the Parties (COP) or other forms agreed by the parties.
Accordingly, climate efforts that centre on the Convention and its Kyoto
Protocol have faced legality issues in Indonesia. In addition, the Ratifying Acts
of the Convention and the Protocol merely adopt their rules, which contain no
specific obligations for Indonesia to reduce GHG emission.

B.	National Government Policy Initiatives and the Coordination Problem
Facing legality issues and challenges relating to its soft character,
political commitments are central for the Convention. In democracies, political
commitments are exogenous factors that promote compliance.45 To this end,
the national government has introduced several policy initiatives. The Ministry
of Environment, for instance, has initiated and introduced the National Action
Plan (NAP) on Climate Change, which guides government organs at national
and lower levels in initiating climate mitigation and adaptation efforts.46 The
NAP emphasises the importance of addressing climate change by improving
coordination between various sectors and departments.47 In its mitigation
plan, the NAP focuses on three sectors: energy, Land Use, Land Use Change
and Forestry (LULUCF); and marine and fisheries.48 Adaptation efforts include
actions to maximise water resources, agriculture, marine and fisheries,
infrastructure, public health, forestry and biodiversity, and research and
Environmental Management Act 1997 23 (Indonesia), art 9 (4).
See Validation of the Kyoto Protocol Act 2004 17 (Indonesia).
45
Robert O. Keohane and Kal Raustiala, “Toward A Post-Kyoto Climate Change Architecture: A Political Analysis” (2008) 08-14 UCLA School of Law Law & Economics Research Paper Series Research Paper,
p. 2. See also Ailsa Ceri Warnock, “The Climate Change Regime: Efficacy, Compliance and Enforcement”
(2004) 8 New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law, 99, p. 102.
46
Indonesia’s Ministry of Environment, Rencana Aksi Nasional Dalam Menghadapi Perubahan
Iklim (National Action Plan for Facing Climate Change), (Ministry of Environment, Jakarta, 2007), p. 2.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid., p. 33-52.
43
44
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development.49 The NAP also restates Indonesia’s commitment to contribute
to climate change efforts under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol.50

Although the national government has introduced the NAP, coordination
among different government organs can be challenging. One particular reason
for this is that the causes of climate change involve many sectors that are
under the authority of different departments. The NAP identifies two general
problems Indonesia faces in relation to climate change issues. The first relates
to the management of natural resources regarding land use, water resources,
housing, LULUCF, and marine resources. The second focuses on energy
consumption.51 Each of these sectors is under the authority of different
ministries. However, no ministry is specifically responsible for coordinating
climate change efforts. Although the Ministry of Environment designed the
NAP, the Ministry has no authority over other ministries. In addition, the
Ministry of Environment established the National Commission on Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM).52 Yet, this institution mainly functions as
a Designated National Authority (DNA) of the CDM, which authorises CDM
projects in Indonesia.
The President also established the National Board on Climate Change.53
This Board is expected to improve coordination of climate change-related
efforts domestically and to strengthen Indonesia’s position in international
climate change negotiations.54 This board has wide authority, from formulating
policies, strategies and programs on climate change efforts and carbon
trading, to coordinating, evaluating and implementing climate policies and
programs.55

However, this Board faces practical difficulties in coordinating the
Ministries because of its institutional character. According to Asshiddiqie,
Indonesia’s constitutional law differentiates the hierarchy of the state and
government organs according to their legal formation.56 Organs that are
formed based on the Constitution’s order have a higher hierarchy than those
formed by an Act or lower laws.57 As the Presidential Regulation forms the
Board, it has a lower status than the Ministries, which are formed by order of
the Constitution.58 As a result, it can be difficult for the Board to undertake its
coordination function in relation to Ministerial policies and regulations.
Furthermore, the difficulties in coordination persist even though the
49
50
51

anism.
ation c.

52
53
54

Ibid., p. 54-68.
Ibid., p. 18.
Ibid., p. 7-17.
See the Decision of the Minister of Environment No. 206/2005 on the Clean Development MechSee President Regulation 2008 4 (Indonesia) on the National Board on Climate Change.
President Regulation 2008 46 (Indonesia) on the National Board on Climate Change, consider-

See President Regulation 2008 46 (Indonesia) on the National Board on Climate Change, art 3.
Jimly Asshiddiqie, “Hubungan Antar Lembaga Negara Pasca Perubahan UUD 1945” (“Relation
Between State Body Post 1945 Constitution’s Amendment”), presented in the Focus Group Discussion of
National Defense Institution, 15 December 2010, (The Constitutional Court, 2010), p. 11.
57
Ibid.
58
See Constitution (Indonesia) art 17 (1) to (4).
55
56
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members of the Board are the President and the Ministers.59 In the absence
of a specific law that addresses climate change, each department introduces
policies that address their respective sectors. A policy introduced by a
department will reflect sectoral policies and regulations, as the Constitution
guarantees that each of the Ministries is responsible for certain areas
of governance.60 This situation gives rise to uncoordinated policies and
regulations, which increases the possibility of contradictions between these
policies or regulations.
Accordingly, while these initiatives demonstrate the commitment of
the national government to undertake climate efforts under the Convention,
they face other domestic challenges, especially in relation to coordination
between various sectors. These challenges suggest that even if the Convention
faces coordination challenges at the national level, more challenges will
emerge when dealing with lower government units under the context of
decentralisation.
II. The Decentralisation Model and International Agreement

Because of decentralisation, the national government faces difficulties
in directing lower government units to legally and politically observe the
Convention rules. This is particularly the case in regard to the use of Indonesia’s
natural resources.

A. The Background to Indonesia’s Decentralisation
Indonesia’s decentralisation reform has an economic and political
background that can constrain the national government in undertaking
climate efforts. Economic factors generated political pressures regarding the
gaining of political power from the national government. The combination of
these economic and political factors helped to initiate decentralisation reform.

Economically speaking, under the Soeharto regime (1966-1998), the
social and economic structure benefited the national government. Rachbini
explains that during the New Order Regime, only a limited number of
businessmen had wide access to bank credits. Others, especially small and
medium sized entrepreneurs, had limited access.61 At the same time, the
distribution of credits was geographically unequal. The distribution of bank
credits focused on Java Island, particularly in the capital Jakarta. During the
New Order regime, the Eastern part of Indonesia received only 5 percent of
the total national credits.62
Furthermore, government tax income from all over Indonesia, which
was intended to be shared as part of the development fund for the regions,
was also distributed unequally. Mubyarto suggests that the New Order regime
tried to centre development and industrialisation in Java Island. As a result,
See President Regulation 2008 46 (Indonesia) on the National Board on Climate Change, art 4.
See Constitution (Indonesia) art 17 (3).
61
Didik J. Rachbini, Politik Ekonomi Baru: Menuju Demokrasi Ekonomi (New Political Economy:
Towards Democratic Economy), (Grasindo, Jakarta, 2001), p. ix.
62
Ibid.
59
60
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the economic gap between Java and other regions was very wide.63 In 1970,
Java Island, which was inhabited by 60 per cent of Indonesia’s population,
was 30-35 per cent poorer than other islands. Interestingly, by the beginning
of 1990, Java’s economy was performing 30-35 per cent better than the other
Islands.64

This economic gap resulted in social and political problems. People
from areas that significantly contributed to the Indonesian economy, such as
Aceh, Papua, Riau, Kalimantan and other areas, were not satisfied with the
national government policies. Natural resources in these areas were exploited
extensively, but the benefits from the resources did not contribute significantly
to the economy in these areas.65

After the fall of the Soeharto regime, many regions with valuable natural
resources demanded a greater role in managing their local affairs and a greater
share in the revenue from their natural resources.66 The freedom movements
that occurred in several parts of Indonesia created new democratic pressures
for the regions to gain governmental power, and the national government
undertook steps to meet this demand by decentralising governmental
power.67 The national government hoped that the sharing of power would
reduce separatist sentiments.68 The social and political problems caused by
the economic disparity were worsened by the economic crisis in Asia in 1997.
Lindsey argues that the failure of the New Order regime to provide transparent
and predictable administration contributed to the catastrophic scale of the
economic crisis in Indonesia. The extraordinary political circumstances
following the economic crisis resulted in the fall of the Soeharto regime in
1998, which helped to establish decentralisation efforts.69
Amidst this social, economical and political background of
decentralisation, the dependence of the Convention on political support raises
challenges. The national government cannot simply guide lower government
units to undertake climate efforts.

B. Indonesia’s Decentralisation Model: Institutional Arrangement
The institutional set-up and sharing of authority in Indonesia’s
decentralised context also creates challenges for the national government in

63
Mubyarto, “Otonomi Daerah dan Ekonomi Kerakyatan” (“Local Autonomy and Democracy Economy”) in Bonar Simorangkir et al (eds), Otonomi atau Federalisme: Dampaknya terhadap perekonomian
(Autonomy or Federalism: Effects to Economy Condition), (Pustaka Sinar Harapan and Suara Pembaruan,
Jakarta, 2000) 34, p. 36.
64
Ibid.
65
Albert Situmorang, “Sejarah Pemberontakan di Indonesia: Ketidakpuasan Rasionalisasi”
<http://www.indonesia-house.org/archive/060603Sejarah_pemberontakan.htm> at May 1st 2010.
66
Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, “Closer to People and Trees: Will Decentralisation Work for the
People and the Forests of Indonesia?” (2004) 16 (1) European Journal of Development Research, 110, p.
111.
67
SMERU, “Indonesia’s Decentralisation Policy: initial experiences and emerging problems” (a paper prepared for the third EUROSEAS Conference panel on Decentralisation and Democratization in Southeast Asia, September 2001), p. 2.
68
Ibid.
69
Tim Lindsey, “From Rule of Law to Law of the Rulers-to Reformation?” in Tim Lindsey (Ed) Indonesian Law and Society, (Federation Press, NSW, Australia, 1999) 11 p. 19.
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effectively coordinating lower government units.
1. Governmental Arrangement
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Indonesia’s decentralisation model, in focusing on the local government,
creates a disconnection between the provincial government and local/city
governments.74 The administrative hierarchical relation between the national
government and lower government units (see Figure 1) differs from the
74
governments.
TheFigure
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and regulations also determine the share of the governmental authority.

Act No. 22/1999 granted significant power to provincial and local/city
governments, based on the administrative border scheme. Except for authority
over international politics, defence, the judiciary, fiscal and monetary affairs,
and religious affairs, the provincial and local governments could implement
their authority over other governmental sectors.76 Administrative borders
determined the sharing of power of different levels of government. A
provincial government had authority over affairs involving two or more local
governments,77 with an administrative border of up to 12 nautical miles.78 A
local government had power to manage natural resources in their area, up to
4 nautical miles.79

This governmental sharing model affected the sharing of authority
under sectoral laws. In the forestry sector, the Regent, the Governor and the
Minister of Forestry could issue a license based on the administrative border
scheme.80 In the mining sector, the same administrative border scheme
was applicable. Shortly after the implementation of decentralisation policy,
authority over the mining sector changed.81 Local governments can now issue
mining concessions within their administrative areas (up to 4 nautical miles)
and provincial governments can issue concessions when the proposed areas
involve two or more areas of local governments, or within 4 to 12 nautical
miles. Further, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources could issue
mining concessions when the area involves two or more provincial areas or
outside the 12 nautical miles territory.82

In 2004, Act. No 32/2004 revoked Act No. 22/1999 and remains in force.
This new Act provides a more complicated governmental sharing regime. It
grants rights to the provincial and local/city governments to implement their
autonomy. Except for the six excluded authorities,83 other authorities are under
the autonomy of the lower government organs. However, the Act also states
that besides these six authorities, the national government can implement
the other authorities itself, transfer authority to the Governors, or order the
provincial, local/city, and village governments to run its authority.84 The term
“other authorities” is considered as “concurrent authorities,” which are shared
by all levels of governments85 and governed by the Government Regulation
No. 38.2007 on the Sharing of Authority between the National, Provincial
Regional Government Act (Indonesia) 1999 22, art 7 (1).
Regional Government Act (Indonesia) 1999 22, art 9 (1).
78
Regional Government Act (Indonesia) 1999 22, art 3.
79
Regional Government Act (Indonesia) 1999 22, art 10 (3).
80
Government Regulation 2002 34 (Indonesia) on Forestry Management Regulation, art 38.
81
Government Regulation 2001 75 (Indonesia) on the Second Amendment of the implementation
of the Mineral Act No 11/1967, p. the consideration.
82
Government Regulation 2001 75 (Indonesia) on the Second Amendment of the implementation
of the Mineral Act No 11/1967, art 1.
83
These six authorities are (1) international politics; (2) defence; (3) security; (4) judicial power;
(5) national fiscal and monetary; and (6) religious affairs. See Regional Government Act 2004 32, art 10 (3).
84
Regional Government Act 2004 32, art 10 (5).
85
The elucidation explains that concurrent authorities are the authorities that can be run by the
national, the provincial and local government due to the nature of authorities. See the elucidation of the
Regional Government Act 2004 32, part I, 3.
76
77
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and Local/City Governments.86 As a result, the national government actually
retains all government authorities, and the transfer of authority to lower
government units is subject to the discretion of the national government.87
The President enacts a government regulation to implement an Act88 or a
decision of the Supreme Court,89 based on a draft proposed by the relevant
ministries.90
Generally, Government Regulation No. 38/2007 provides power to
the national government to set up norms and policies in the forestry sector.
The provincial government is given the role of supervising national forestry
policies of provincial scale. The local/city governments have most of the policy
implementing power, such as dealing with the control of mining operations
and environmental assessments.91 In essence, the introduction of the new
decentralisation laws has tried to reduce the role of the administrative
border scheme in determining the sharing of governmental authority
between different levels of government. This regulation not only employs the
administrative border scheme to share governmental authority but also uses
other schemes. For instance, national government shares the authority to
issue forestry licenses with provincial and local governments, based on legal
provisions related to decentralisation laws. Those who want to use forest
timber must obtain a license from the Minister of Forestry, while others who
want to pick timber products in forests can obtain a license from the Governor
or Regent/Mayor.92 Government Regulation No. 38/2007 distinguishes the
meaning of use which implies extraction, and pick which means collection, in
determining the kind of license issued. The difference between the two terms
refers to the scale of timber log harvesting.
In sectoral laws and regulations, legal provisions and administrative
borders are both used to determine the sharing of authority. The Forestry
Regulation, for instance, shares the authority to issue a license based on
the type of license93 and the administrative border.94 By comparison, in the
mining sector, the administrative border still functions as the basis for sharing
authority. The Mineral Act provides significant authority for the provincial
and local governments over the issuance of mining licenses based on the
administrative border scheme. 95
A comparison of the forestry and mining regimes suggests that the
sia).

86

This Regulation is the implementing regulation of Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indone-

87
See also Butt: “legally speaking, the central government can continue to regulate any matter over
which regional governments also have jurisdiction”. Simon Butt, “Regional Autonomy and Legal Disorder:
the Proliferation of Local Laws in Indonesia” (2010), Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 1, p. 7.
88
See the Forming of Laws Act 2011 12 (Indonesia), art 1 (5).
89
See the Forming of Laws Act 2011 12 (Indonesia), art 28 (2).
90
See the Forming of Laws Act 2011 12 (Indonesia), art 27.
91
Government Regulation 2007 38 (Indonesia) on the Sharing of Authority between the National
Provincial and Local/City governments, p. attachment BB.
92
Government Regulation 2007 38 (Indonesia) on the Sharing of Authority between the National,
Provincial, and Local governments, the Forestry Sector Attachment AA, number 34.
93
See for Instance, Government Regulation 2007 6 (Indonesia) on the Management and the Usage
of Forest, art 60.
94
See for instance, Government Regulation 2007 6 (Indonesia) on the Management and the Usage
of Forest, art 61.
95
Mineral and Coal Mining Act 2009 4 (Indonesia), art 6, 7 and 8.
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legal provisions and administrative border scheme are both applicable bases
for the sharing of authority. As a result, the particular authority of different
levels of government over a variety of sectors will depend on the sectoral laws
and regulations, not merely the decentralisation regime. This can increase
the possibility of contradictory policies and interpretations regarding the
authority of different levels of governments.

C. The Effects of Decentralisation on the Forestry Sector
Indonesia’s decentralisation may have reduced tensions arising in the
regions. By the sharing of power, the extent of separatist sentiments which
prevailed in many provinces was reduced.96 However, decentralisation has
generated environmental degradation, which in turn can result in an increased
rate of GHG emissions. This can be a result of the existence of “optional
authorities” that are shared by different levels of governments.
Many have identified the effects of decentralisation on the forestry
sector. The underlying causes of deforestation are varied. From an economic
perspective, Barr et al suggest that the euphoria of decentralisation caused
district officials to issue large numbers of “small-scale timber extraction” and
forest conversion permits that aim to impose new types of fees and royalties on
“log harvesting” as a means to generate “regionally-generated revenues.”97 At
the same time, social and political causes of deforestation have also emerged.
Bertrand suggests that following the fall of the regime, local communities
have tried to transform the centralistic forest management under the New
Order Regime into a greater freedom to reclaim the forest areas on which
they relied on for daily living.98 Under this situation, the national government
may have lost its dominant control over natural resources.99 Decentralisation
has created legitimate and illegitimate procedures for gaining benefits from
natural resources because of the involvement of various actors.100
The underlying cause of the effects of decentralisation on the forestry
sector is the failure to determine the exact nature of authority. Indonesia’s
decentralisation recognises the obligatory and optional authorities of the
provincial and local/city governments.101 The Decentralisation Act lists
the obligatory authorities, which includes environmental control. Optional
authorities also grant rights for the regions to determine whether they will
maximise the local potential to improve the people’s welfare according to
the characteristics of each region.102 The existence of the optional authorities
is crucial for the decentralisation scheme as it provides a flexible term that
result in a wide interpretation of authority.
SMERU, see note 70, p. 2.
Christopher Barr and others, Decentralisation of Forest Administration in Indonesia: Implications for Forest Sustainability, Economic Development and Community Livelihoods, (CIFOR, Bogor, 2006)
at 79.
98
Jacques Bertrand, “Indonesia’s Quasi-Federalist Approach: Accommodation amid Strong Integrationist Tendencies,” (2007) 5 (4), International Journal of Constitutional Law, 576, at 2.
99
John F McCarthy, “Local Voice in Shifting Modes of Decentralised Resource Control in Central
Kalimantan, Indonesia” (2007) 65, Management in Asia-Pacific Working Paper, at 6.
100
Ibid.
101
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 11 (3).
102
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 13 (2).
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In the management of natural resources, these optional authorities
are critical as the national, provincial and local governments share their
authorities.103 Although the Decentralisation Act tries to limit the flexibility
of the optional authorities by introducing a requirement to refer to laws and
regulations, different interpretations on optional authority may still emerge.
For example, a Regent (the head of a Kabupaten or regency), may see the
potential of a natural resource in a region, and decide to invest in it. Natural
resource exploitation may then take place. Such a decision can contradict
with national government policy. Rusli and Duek suggest that decentralisation
meets the demands of the provincial and local governments to gain revenue
from natural resources. Indonesia’s decentralisation facilitates their desires
to implement their decentralised authority.� McCarthy advises that local
governments adopt a regulatory system which “creatively” uses the national
legal system for local benefits.�

D. Treaty and Lower Government Units
Under international law, once a state concludes an international
agreement, “a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire
territory.”104 Yet, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not
specify how a state implements an international agreement in its domestic
jurisdiction.105 Thus, the state parties should ensure that obligations arising
from an international agreement have domestic effect, where all state organs
must comply with the national law in order to facilitate the fulfilment of
the obligations raised by the international agreement.106 In fact, Indonesia
requires lower government units to perform rules of international agreements.
However, this requirement is not firm.
The Decentralisation Act (32/2004) does not specifically refer to any
obligation for lower government units to comply with international agreements
in any of its rules. This can only be found in the elucidation provision of the Act,
which classifies the fulfilment of the national commitment to international
agreements as obligatory tasks of the lower government units.107 As a result,
the requirement to perform an international agreement exists, not as a legal
rule but as an explanation of a term in the elucidation of the Act.
Furthermore, in several provinces where special autonomy applies,
such as Aceh, Papua and West Papua, different arrangements exist. In Aceh,
although the national government retains control over international politics,
the Government of Aceh has considerable power. The Aceh government
Act states that where the national government considers a plan to conclude
an international agreement that relates only to Aceh, the Aceh Provincial
Legislative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh/DPRA) must be
consulted.108
103
104
105
106
107
108

Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 17.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), art 29.
Anthony Aust, see note 4, p. 179.
Ibid.
The Elucidation of Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia) on art 11 (3) c.
Aceh Government Act 2006 11 (Indonesia), art 8 (1).
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This consultation requirement, however, has a political character rather
than a legal one. When the DPRA fails to consider the relevant plan within
45 days, the national government can proceed regardless.109 The absence of
consideration might suggest that the DPRA agrees with the proposed plan. Yet,
political tension arises when the DPRA proposes a modification to the plan
but the national government cannot accommodate the modification. In this
sense, musyawarah (consultation) is the only solution.110 However, no time
limit is set for the consultation process and no alternative solution is provided
if both sides fail to agree. As a result, an impasse may emerge: the national
government cannot proceed with the proposed plan, but the DPRA cannot
reject the plan either until both sides achieve a consensus. This scenario also
applies to administrative arrangements. When the national government is
considering a national administrative policy that directly relates to the Aceh
Government, the Governor of Aceh needs to be consulted.111 In the event the
national government cannot accommodate the Governor’s view, consultation
is the only solution.112
Moreover, the provinces of Papua and West Papua also have special
autonomy. The special autonomy in these two provinces has granted authority
over all affairs to the provincial government, except authority over foreign
politics, national defence and security, national fiscal and monetary affairs,
religious affairs, and the court, along with “other affairs” that are specifically
regulated by other Indonesia’s laws.113 When the national government intends
to conclude an international agreement that only relates to the interests of the
Papua and West Papua provinces, the Governors’ consideration is required.114
Unlike the procedure for Aceh’s special autonomy scheme, which is governed
by a Presidential Regulation, the procedure for the Governors of Papua and
West Papua to consider proposed international agreement initiated by the
national government is governed by a Special Provincial Regulation (Peraturan
Daerah Khusus/Perdasus) enacted by each of these provinces.115 However
after close examination, as at February 2012, no Perdasus has been enacted

109
President Regulation 2008 75 (Indonesia) on the Procedure on Providing Considerations for
a Plan of International Agreement, a Plan to Form Laws and Administrative Policy Relating Directly to the
Aceh Government, art 3 (2), (3) and (4).
110
President Regulation 2008 75 (Indonesia) on the Procedure on Providing Considerations for
a Plan of International Agreement, a Plan to Form Laws and Administrative Policy Relating Directly to the
Aceh Government, art 4 (3).
111
President Regulation 2008 75 (Indonesia) on the Procedure on Providing Considerations for
a Plan of International Agreement, a Plan to Form Laws and Administrative Policy Relating Directly to the
Aceh Government, art 7 (1).
112
President Regulation 2008 75 (Indonesia) on the Procedure on Providing Considerations for
a Plan of International Agreement, a Plan to Form Laws and Administrative Policy Relating Directly to the
Aceh Government, art 9 (3).
113
Special Autonomy for Papua Province Act 2001 21 (Indonesia), art 4 (1). The phrase “other
affairs” provides wide possibilities for interpretation. When the authority of the Governments of Papua
and West Papua based on this Act is limited by the other Indonesia’s Act, which one will prevail? Potential
conflict of interpretation can easily arise.
114
Special Autonomy for Papua Province Act 2001 21 (Indonesia), art 4 (6).
115
Special Autonomy for Papua Province Act 2001 21 (Indonesia), art 4 (9). A special Papua Provincial Government Regulation (Peraturan Daerah Khusus/Perdasus) in the Papua and West Papua Province is specially enacted to implement an order of the Special Autonomy Act. A Perdasus is different from
a Papua Provincial Government Regulation (Peraturan Daerah Provinsi/Perdasi) that is enacted to implement the authority of the Papuan Province pursuant to laws and regulations. See art 1 (i) and (j).
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in the both provinces that specifically addresses the terms and conditions
for the Governors to provide consideration on the proposed international
agreement. As a result, the requirement for consideration is still subject to
multiple interpretations.
III. The Burdens of Decentralisation

Decentralisation creates burdens for the national government in
initiating climate efforts under the Convention. These burdens are associated
with coordination problems, legality issues and challenges relating to
Indonesia’s social and political background.

A. International Political Arrangement Generates Burdens
Indonesia’s decentralisation laws suggest that international politics is
the exclusive domain of the national government. This exclusivity isolates
lower government units from international politics. In the context of
decentralisation, this approach is sometimes problematic as it generates
constraints for the relationship between national government and lower
government units.

The isolation of lower government units from international politics
suggests a centralist approach that reduces the participation of lower
government units. Fundamentally, decentralisation requires the intergovernmental or political transfer of powers and responsibilities to an elected
local government, which exercises a significant measure of local autonomy.116
Such a transfer will bring governments closer to the consumers of public
services, and any governmental policy will become closely controlled by the
citizens.117 Under the centralist approach, however, public participation will
be low. The centralist approach creates a disconnection between international
and domestic politics. Local government, which is closer to people, has no
influence in any international negotiations. This can become a burden when
the national government negotiates a treaty that can affect the authority of
lower government units.
Certain international agreements can still work despite this
disconnection, especially those that do not directly relate to the concurrent
authorities that are shared by different levels of government. For instance,
Indonesia’s ratification of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations118
does not directly relate to the authority of lower government units. Rather, the
Vienna Convention119 emphasises privileges and immunities for diplomats,
which facilitates the performance of functions by the consular posts on behalf
of their respective states.120 This emphasis suggests that it is the national

116
Nick Devas, “Indonesia: what do we mean by decentralisation?” (1997) 19, Public Administration and Development, p. 2.
117
Ibid.
118
Indonesia validates the 1963 Vienna Convention by Act No. 1/1982.
119
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (opened for signature 24 April 1963, entered into
force 19 March 1967).
120
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (opened for signature 24 April 1963, entered into
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government of each state that plays a significant role in the implementation of
the Vienna Convention at the domestic level. As a result, the role of the lower
government units is not significant.

By contrast, when an international agreement involves the sharing
of authority between different levels of government, as is the case for the
Convention on climate change, problems can emerge. While Indonesia has
become a party to the Convention, the lower government units have committed
to actions that contribute to Indonesia’s high rate of GHG emissions from
deforestation. Contradiction between international politics and domestic
politics exists.
This contradiction is not merely political but also legal. For instance,
Indonesia’s commitment to the UNFCCC may require the national government
to alter the authority of the provinces and local government. Yet, the
exploitation of forests based on the granting of timber concessions by local
government has alarmingly increased deforestation. At this point, the action
of local government contradicts with the national government’s legal
commitment under the Convention.
Therefore, the arrangement of international politics under Indonesia’s
decentralisation can become a burden for the implementation of the UNFCCC.
When fulfilment of an international commitment does not require the
engagement of lower government units, domestic politics are not significant.
In the context of the UNFCCC in Indonesia, though international politics is
the exclusive domain of the national government, the national government
depends on lower government units to fulfil international commitments.

B. Coordination Problems
Because decentralisation focuses on local/city governments,
coordination between different levels of government can be a huge challenge.
This challenge is due to the national government’s capacity to control local
government action and the wide authority of local governments to introduce
local policies.

The capacity to control local government action can raise coordination
problems. Focusing decentralisation on local/city governments requires
the national government to coordinate its policies. The role of provincial
governments is limited as the local/city governments receive authority
directly from the national government. This condition is problematic because
Indonesia consists of more than 300 local/city governments.
Coordination between the different levels of government emphasises the
vital role of the provincial governments. Governors not only act as the heads of
their autonomous regions but they also retain a hierarchical relationship with
the central government.121 This dual function of Governors can facilitate the
national government in reaching local government level. However, this dual

force 19 March 1967) preamble: “Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to
benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular posts on behalf of their
respective States.”
121
Norio Usui and Armida Alisjahbana, see note 73, p. 2.
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function creates a dilemma. As the head of autonomous regions, Governors
need to consider the political dynamics within their provinces, as they are
directly elected in a general election.122 As a result, potential conflicts of interest
may emerge, because Governors will need to choose who they are answerable
to: the national government or their constituents. When a Governor is from
the same political party as the ruling party at the national level, the situation
may not be very complicated. The Governor will most likely follow national
government policy. However, when the Governor is from the opposition party
at the national level, the potential of disobedience is high. The situation is
even more complicated when a Regent is also from a political party which
differs from the ruling parties at both the national and provincial levels.

Moreover, the sharing of governmental power according to the various
governmental regulations, and based on a combination of the administrative
border scheme and legal provisions, can worsen policy coordination problems.
Decentralisation allows the provincial and local/city governments to introduce
Local Government Regulations (Peraturan Daerah/Perda).123 Perda are
enacted to implement higher laws and regulations, with consideration given
to the specific characteristics of each region.124 Perda provide opportunities
for provincial and local/city governments to introduce local policies, so as
long as a Perda does not contradict higher laws and regulations.125 Given the
variety of standards and legal provisions used by higher laws and regulations
to determine the sharing of governmental authority, the risk of contradiction
between policies can be high. During the process of enacting Perda, which
must consider the various standards and legal provisions set by higher laws
and regulations, different interpretations can emerge relating to the authority
of the provincial and local/city government. Contradiction with higher laws
and regulations is thus highly likely. In addition, the opportunity for Perda to
reflect the special characteristics of each region suggests it is likely that local
policies will contradict with national policies. The extent of the possibilities
for contradiction correlates with the high number of Perda that are under
the review of the national government. According to the Minister of Internal
Affairs, the Ministry finished evaluating 4500 Perda in July 2011, where 175
were annulled and the rest were recommended for amendment. As at October
2011, 9000 problematic Perda remained to be evaluated by the Ministry.126
The potential contradiction of Perda with higher law and regulation
is worsened by the problematic mechanism and practice used to evaluate
Perda. Basically, the ability for lower government units (provinces and local/
city governments) to adopt Perda is equipped with a review mechanism that
employs bureaucratic and judicial processes. In bureaucratic process the
position of the national government is central. 7 days after the enactment,
a Perda should be received by the national government127 for a review. When
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 24 (5).
A Perda can be enacted by the provincial government or local/city government by an agreement of the executive and legislative. See the Forming of Laws Act 2011 12 (Indonesia), art 1 (7) and (8).
124
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 136 (3).
125
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 136 (4).
126
See Kontan, “Evaluasi 9.000 Perda bermasalah digelar sampai 2014” (“Evaluation of 9.000
Problematic Perda held Until 2014”), (17 Oktober 2011), <http://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/evaluasi9.000-perda-bermasalah-digelar-sampai-2014-1> at 6 June 2012.
127
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 145 (1).
122
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the national government perceives that the Perda is against public interests
or/and contradicts higher laws and regulations,128 it can cancel the Perda
through a Presidential Regulation.129 This review process takes approximately
60 days.130 The relevant local government or provincial government has
only seven days to revoke the Perda,131 or it can challenge the Presidential
Regulation in the Supreme Court.132
For some Perda, a pre-enactment-approval requirement applies and the
process follows the governmental hierarchy. At the provincial level, a draft
Perda that sets an annual budget requires a pre-approval from the Ministry
of Home Affairs.133 A draft Perda that aims to impose local tax and charges,
requires coordination with the Ministry of Finance, while a draft Perda that
arranges local spatial planning requires coordination with the relevant
Ministries.134 For the local government level, the similar scenario applies,
though the role of the relevant ministries is replaced by governors.135
An annual budget Perda is reviewed within 15 days by higher level
of governments.136 When the Perda (provincial level) is considered by the
national government through the Ministry of Home Affairs (in coordination
with relevant ministries) as not against public interests and higher laws,
it will get an approval and can be enacted by Governor.137 On the contrary,
when a provincial Perda is considered as against the interests of public and
higher laws and regulations, the Governor and Provincial Council have seven
days to make amendments.138 Failure to do so will give the authority for the
Ministry of Home Affairs to cancel the plan to enact the Perda, which directly
applies the previous year budget.139 The similar arrangement applies to local/
city governments Perda: the Governor has the right to review, approve or
disapprove Perda in the local/city governments’ level.140
This bureaucratic review process is problematic. Butt,141 for instance,
identifies that the national government through the Ministry of Home Affairs
has limited capacity to evaluate Perda because the number of problematic
Perda was very high while the Ministry has limited personnel. As a result,
many Perda that were annulled cannot fulfil the 15 days time limit. Many
were annulled after two years of under review.142 In addition, the absence
of sanctions for local governments that refuse to submit their new Perda for
evaluation provides them a wide possibility to bypass the bureaucratic review
mechanism.143
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Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 145 (2).
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art (3).
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 93).
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art (4).
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art (5).
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 185.
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 189.
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 186.
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 185, 186 and 189.
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 185 (3).
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 185 (4).
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 185 (5).
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 186 (4), (5).
Simon Butt, see note 89, p. 1.
Ibid., p. 12.
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Furthermore, the mechanism to review of Perda also has judicial
channel. When the National Government through a Presidential regulation
decides to revoke a Perda,144 the relevant Province or local/city government
can challenge the decision in the Supreme Court.145 This can result in the
revocation of the Presidential Regulation.146 Citizens can also challenge Perda
in the Supreme Court. In Indonesia’s legal system, judicial review can take
place in the Constitutional Court when it involves an act, while lower sources
of laws such as Government Regulation, Presidential Regulation, Perda
(Province and local/city governments) can only involve in a judicial review in
the Supreme Court147 through lower courts.148

The existence of this judicial process mechanism may provide
opportunities for lower government units to challenge decisions of the
National Government that revoke a Perda. At the same time, citizens can
directly challenge Perda that burden them. However, while this process is
very critical on disputes over Perda, the process in the Supreme Court might
be flawed. The Supreme Court has not as yet effectively performed its Perda
review function due to the time limit that applies to the review of Perda
(180 days after enactment) and the court’s limited capacity to consider the
substance of Perda.149 In addition, the two review mechanisms have only
focused on the review of Perda that aims to impose local tax and levies, but
not for Perda that related to, for instance, the violation of human rights.150
C. Vague Obligations to Fulfil International Commitments
Indonesia’s legal system does not firmly establish a link between the
Convention and lower government units. Obligation on lower government
units to fulfil commitments under international agreements is vague.

The fulfilment of international commitments is not a legal obligation
but only a formal interpretation of the term “obligatory authority” in the
Decentralisation Act. The Decentralisation Act does not define the term
“obligatory authority.” Yet the Act lists obligatory authorities for the Provincial
and Local/City governments. These authorities generally include development
planning and control, environmental control, and providing basic services
and infrastructure to the community.151 This Act does not mention anything
about international commitments. However, in its elucidation, the fulfilment
of international commitment is included. The elucidation provision of Art
11(3) explains the term “obligatory authority” as comprising fundamental
tasks that relate to the fulfilment of rights and basic services for the citizen.
144
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 145 (3). For a Provincial Perda on Annual
Budget, the Ministry of Home Affairs has the authority to cancel the Perda along with its Governor Regulation that implements the Perda on annual budget. See art 185. For local/city governments’ Perda on Annual
Budget, relevant Governors have the authority to cancel the Perda. See art 186.
145
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 145 (5).
146
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 145 (6).
147
The Forming of Laws Act 2011 12, art 9. See also the Supreme Court Act 1970 14, art 26 (1).
148
The Supreme Court Regulation on Judicial Review No. 01/2011, art 2.
149
For further discussion of the problem to review Perda in the Supreme Court, see Simon Butt,
see note 147.
150
Ibid., p. 4.
151
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This includes the protection of constitutional rights, the protection of national
interests, the welfare of the people, public safety and the unity of the state,
and the fulfilment of national commitments to international agreements.152

This suggests that provincial and local governments should also
observe international rules that the national government has committed to.
This elucidation provision requires provincial and local government not to
adopt policies that can contradict with international commitments agreed
to by the national government. In this scenario, government units from the
national level down to the local government levels are responsible for the
fulfilment of the goal of the UNFCCC. As a result, although the provincial and
local government can issue licenses for timber extraction, this authority is
not without limitation. The issuance of timber extraction licenses can reduce
forest cover, which can lead to an increase of emissions from deforestation, and
therefore contradict with the goal of the Convention. The issuance of timber
licenses should take into account Indonesia’s commitment to the Convention.
However, this obligatory authority to fulfil international commitments
is vague for the following reasons. First, this authority has a weak character.
While the character is said to be obligatory, no sanction is applicable when
a lower government unit introduces a policy that contradicts with the goal
of the Convention. Fulfilment of the national commitment to the Convention
may depend on lower government units, yet no legal obligation exists in the
event of violation. The Decentralisation Act suggests that the fulfilment of an
international commitment is the obligation of the lower government units but
it creates no sanctions for non-compliance.

Second, the requirement for provincial and local governments to fulfil
the national commitment to an international agreement as part of their
obligatory authority is ambiguous. In Indonesia’s legal system, the elucidation
provisions of Acts only contain explanations of rules,153 which aim to provide a
formal interpretation of the text of the rules.154 Regarding the term “obligatory
authority,” the elucidation of the Decentralisation Act explains that this term
relates to the fulfilment of rights and basic services for citizens.155 However,
when the elucidation elaborates on the kinds of obligatory authority,
which includes the fulfilment of national commitments to international
agreements,156 it introduces a norm. As a result, the elucidation exceeds its
explanatory function, and the inclusion of the requirement for the lower
government units raises a legitimacy problem.
The obligation of provincial and local governments to fulfil international
commitments of the national government is not strong and can easily raise
tensions among different levels of governments.

See the elucidation on the article 11 (3) of Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia).
See the Forming of Law Act 10 2004 (Indonesia), art 47. After the revocation of this Act and
replaced by Act No. 12 2011 (Indonesia), the function of the elucidation remains the same. See art 84.
154
Jimly Asshidiqie, Pengantar Hukum Tata Negara Jilid 1 (Introduction to Constitutional Law Part
1), (Sekretariat Jendral dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah Konstitusi, Jakarta, 2006), p. 82.
155
See Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), the elucidation of the article 11 (3).
156
See Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), the elucidation of the article 11 (3).
152
153

Volume 4 Number 1, January - April 2014

INDONESIA Law Review

~ 26 ~

IV. The Convention in Indonesia’s Decentralisation
Having only a soft legal obligation and facing legality issues in Indonesia’s
context, political commitments are central to the effective implementation
of the Convention. Keohane and Raustiala advise that any international
agreement on climate change requires political commitment. In democracies,
political commitments that require public support are “exogenous” factors
that determine the effectiveness of an international agreement at the domestic
level.157 However, while political commitments are central, the national
government faces difficulties in exerting such commitments for climate efforts
due to domestic factors associated with the legal and political issues.
Indonesia’s ratification procedure leaves open legality issues relating to
the ratifying laws. The Ratifying Acts of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol
are not clear sources of law. Although taking the form of an Act, which is a valid
legal source, these Ratifying Acts remain ambiguous. It is not clear whether
they are an instrument of ratification or transformation. These legality issues
have merely added to the problems of initiating climate efforts under the
Convention and its Kyoto Protocol. The Convention only contains general
principles and its Kyoto Protocol excludes Indonesia from any commitment to
reduce GHG emissions. Such a situation suggests that the Convention and its
Kyoto Protocol are ineffective legal instruments in Indonesia’s legal system.
As the Ratifying Acts have faced legality issues, Indonesia’s decentralised
context exacerbates problems concerning the fulfilment of Indonesia’s
commitment to climate efforts. The national government does not have a valid
legal provision which functions as the legal basis to direct lower government
units to observe the Convention. The obligation for lower government units
to fulfil the national commitment on the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol
is vague. Neither valid rules exist nor can any sanction be imposed for lower
government units that are non-compliant.
In this situation, political commitments become important. Support
from lower government units and local actors can facilitate the fulfilment of
national commitment to the Convention. However, gaining political support
from local levels can be difficult. In the forestry sector, if fulfilling national
commitments under the Convention limits the regions in gaining benefits
from forest resources, political support will be reduced. After the fall of the
Soeharto regime, local actors perceived it as the time for them to obtain their
share of the benefits associated with forestry resources.158

The potential lack of political support for climate change mitigation
efforts in the decentralisation context results from two logical consequences of
Indonesia’s decentralisation model. They are the arrangement of international
politics under decentralisation and a necessity for the lower government units
to increase development budgets.
Authority over international politics under decentralisation, which is
exclusively the domain of the national government, denies the significance
of local politics in the implementation of the Convention. The Constitution
157
158
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Christopher Barr and others, see note 99, p. 2.
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guarantees rights for the provinces, regencies and towns to regulate and
administer matters of government on the basis of autonomy and the duty
of assistance.159 In addition, the Decentralisation Act grants rights to lower
government units to implement their regional autonomy as widely as possible
in order to increase the welfare of society in their regions,160 based on the
special characteristics of each province and region.161 These rights are also
complemented by the establishment of optional authorities for provincial
and local governments. Optional authorities include several sectors, such as
agriculture, forestry, energy and mineral resources, tourism, industry, and
trade and transmigration.162 In a region that is rich in natural resources, when
the Regent perceives the potential of those resources to increase the welfare
of society, it is highly likely the potential will be maximized irrespective of any
international commitment.

The denial of local politics may also reduce the legitimacy of the national
commitment to the Convention, given that participation by local actors is not
possible. In certain situations, when an international agreement only requires
the national government to take measures without engaging the regions, this
lack of participation is not fatal. A requirement to submit a yearly report to the
COP of the Convention, for instance, can be done by a ministry at the national
level. However, when Indonesia aims to implement measures that directly
involve the political dynamics of the regions, such as when limiting the use
of forestry resources, participation of the regions prior to the conclusion of
an international agreement is necessary. Such participation will increase the
legitimacy of the national government policies.

The use of local politics for the sake of international politics actually
exists in the special autonomies of Aceh, Papua and West Papua. Although,
the authority of international politics remains in the national government,
the requirement for national government to consult with lower government
units on a plan for an international agreement does not isolate international
politics from domestic politics. The consultation requirement can increase
political participation by the regions. As a result, the concluded international
agreement can have greater legitimacy when implemented in the three
Provinces. However, difficulties can emerge when the national government
intends to conclude an international agreement that contradicts with local
politics in the Provinces.
Furthermore, lower government units need to seek adequate funds to
support their new authority to provide better public services. The transfer
of power from national government to lower government units requires an
adequate budget to support their functions. Inoui and Alisjahbana suggest that
in order for decentralisation to be effectively implemented, lower government
units should be supported by adequate function to meet their new capacity,
while function works properly when there is enough funding available.163

Constitution (Indonesia), art 18 (2).
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 2 (3)
161
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia), art 13 (2) and art 14 (2).
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Government Regulation 2007 38 (Indonesia) on the Sharing of Authority between the National,
Provincial, and Local governments, art 7 (4).
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These conditions indicate that in order to perform their functions, lower
government units will try to increase their revenue. Regions with valuable
natural resources will tend to maximise benefits from resources in their
areas. This tendency is supported by their legal authority to generate local
taxes and levies.164 Prior to the implementation of decentralisation reform in
2001, the national government amended the Act on Regional Taxes and Levies
to accommodate the wide authority of provincial and local government to
introduce local taxes and levies.165 They were given authority to seek locallygenerated income to support their autonomy.166 For regions with valuable
forestry resources, exploitation of forest was considered a solution to support
local government development funds and the resources provided economic
opportunities for local companies.167 As a result, exploitation and conversion
of forests has occurred widely.168 Under these economic conditions and legal
changes, the exploitation of the forestry resources is a logical consequence.
Without generating adequate funds, they cannot run their authorities to serve
the community.
The implementation of the Convention in Indonesia has been
problematic. The legal and political issues have mixed and characterised the
implementation of the Convention in Indonesia’s decentralisation.
V. Conclusion

Indonesia’s decentralisation provides challenges for national
government in performing its commitment under the Convention. These
legal and political issues have raised challenges for the implementation
of the Convention in Indonesia’s decentralisation. This situation suggests
that in Indonesia’s decentralisation, national government has committed
to an international agreement but has faced difficulties in binding its lower
government organs to its international commitments.
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Validation of the Kyoto Protocol Act 2004 17 (Indonesia).
Regional Government Act 2004 32 (Indonesia).
Validation of Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Act 2005 11
(Indonesia).
Aceh Government Act 2006 11 (Indonesia).
Mineral and Coal Mining Act 2009 4 (Indonesia).
Forming of Law Act 2011 12 (Indonesia).
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Decision of Constitutional Court No. 33/PUU-IX/2011 on the Examination of Act No.
38/2008 on the Ratification of Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations.
Government Regulation 2001 75 (Indonesia) on the Second Amendment of the
implementation of the Mineral Act No 11/1967.
Government Regulation 2002 34 (Indonesia) on Forestry Management Regulation.
Government Regulation 2007 6 (Indonesia) on the Management and the Usage of
Forest.
Government Regulation 2007 38 (Indonesia) on the Sharing of Authority between the
National Provincial and Local/City governments.

President Regulation 2008 46 (Indonesia) on the National Board on Climate
Change.
President Regulation 2008 75 (Indonesia) on the Procedure on Providing
Considerations for a Plan of International Agreement, a Plan to
Form Laws and Administrative Policy Relating Directly to the Aceh
Government.
Supreme Court Regulation 2011 01 on Judicial Review.
Decision of the Minister of Environment 2005 206 on the Clean Development
Mechanism.
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